

Clandestine Operations in Italy: The Bulgarian Connection

by
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A plurality of recent events, the most noticeable of which was the abortive attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II, has raised the issue of Bulgarian clandestine involvement in Italian affairs for purposes that, at least in part, probably extend beyond the national boundaries of the Republic of Italy. Concurrently, this development, characterized by the media as the "Bulgarian connection," has generated an unprecedented interest on the part of the public and governmental authorities *vis-a-vis* Bulgarian domestic policy, Italian-Bulgarian relations, and, not least, Bulgaria's role in the attainment of foreign policy objectives peculiar to the Soviet Union and its East European satellites. Until the emergence of the "Bulgarian connection," Italian interest in Bulgarian affairs was practically negligible. Formerly, this Balkan state was occasionally and, indeed, summarily considered solely in conjunction with the politico-military posture of the Warsaw Pact or in relation to the still broader spectrum of Communist-inspired political regimes, regardless of their international alignment.

In the absence of immediate and direct geopolitical preoccupations, former Italian aloofness regarding the Bulgarian scene is attributable in no smaller measure to the concomitantly modest volume of commercial relations between the two countries. Significantly, even within the moderate flow of goods and services between Italy and the Communist states, as compared to Italy's booming trade with her Western partners and the developing nations, import-export statistics show that Bulgaria ranks only in sixth place behind Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR.¹ Another meaningful comparison is provided by a line of credit in the amount of Lit. 1,500 billion granted by Italy in 1981 to Libya — a country with which she has entertained strained relations since 1969 — as opposed to the appreciably lower amount of Lit. 138 billion in Bulgaria's favor during the same year.²

Although no denunciation of the "Bulgarian connection" was ever pronounced before 1982, at least two diplomatic incidents between Rome and Sofia had already occurred at the beginning of the 1960s and of the 1970s, respectively. The first took place on January 20, 1962, when a Bulgarian Mig 19 crash-landed near Acquaviva delle Fonti (Bari) after circling around NATO installations in the area. Moreover, the pilot, Lieutenant M. Solakov of the 11th Reconnaissance Squadron with duty station in Bergovitz, was found in possession of an unexplainably large sum of money. He was repatriated one year later under less than clear circumstances.³ The second incident entailed the expulsion, in 1972, of TABSO representative Bor-

islav Baltchev and commercial attache Dimcho Vazov for undisclosed reasons.

These incidents were presumably assessed by the Italian authorities as isolated occurrences, since no preventive security measures appear to have been specifically adopted against potential Bulgarian agents. Therefore, what is now termed the "Bulgarian connection" comprises events that span from the late 1970s to the start of the present decade. They include espionage/subversive actions attributed to labor union officials Luigi Scricciolo and Paola Elia, a never completed plot to assassinate Polish labor leader Lech Walesa while he was in Rome, the abortive assassination attempt against the "Polish Pope" in St. Peter's Square, and illicit marketing of weapons.

At this particular stage of ongoing judicial, police, and intelligence investigations, there are four incidents that constitute the "Bulgarian connection" and reflect clandestine endeavors. The first is the Scricciolo/Elia case.⁴ On February 4, 1982, Luigi Scricciolo and his wife, Paola Elia, both employed by the Italian Union of Labor (UIL), a moderately left-oriented labor union, were arrested on charges of espionage and participation in an armed band. The arrest warrants were issued subsequent to the confessions of three captured members of the Red Brigades (BR), Italy's major left-wing terrorist organization, whose record includes murders, woundings, kidnappings, and "proletarian expropriations" since the beginning of the 1970s.

The liberation, by a special unit of the Italian State Police, of U.S. Army Brigadier General James L. Dozier, who had been abducted by the BR in Verona on December 17, 1981 and held captive in Padua until January 28, 1982, resulted in testimony by repentant red brigadists Antonio Savasta, Emilia Libera, and Loris Scricciolo (a cousin of Luigi). They identified Luigi Scricciolo and Paola Elia as BR points of contact and sources of information with Bulgarian connections. Moreover, according to the same terrorist sources, Scricciolo and Elia were of value to the BR in re-establishing interrupted weapon-supply channels with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). This was done through the good offices of the Bulgarians, who were in turn interested in General Dozier's "interrogation record," given his sensitive position as Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and Administration of NATO's Southern European Land Forces with headquarters in the city of Verona in northern Italy.

Initially, both Scricciolo and Elia denied all charges. However, in June of 1982, approximately four months after their arrest, the couple began to make progressive admissions, with each partner accusing the other of being responsible for the more serious offenses. Their admissions, coupled with the confessions of the above-mentioned terrorists and with the investigation subsequently conducted by the Rome investigative unit of the Carabinieri (a militarily organized national police force) have produced an elaborate reconstruction of the case.

From 1977 to 1979, Luigi Scricciolo had been active in the ranks of Proletarian Democracy (DP), a small political party of the extreme

left. As DP's international relations specialist, Scricciolo came into contact with accredited Bulgarian diplomats, who eventually provided him with subsidies badly needed by DP in exchange for political and military information. In June of 1979, Scricciolo resigned from DP. Later in the year, he married Paola Elia and joined the staff of UIL's international relations department, where his wife also worked. In view of the couple's access to various types of domestic and international political and economic information, Scricciolo was approached by his old Bulgarian contacts, who successfully blackmailed him with his past actions on their behalf.

The sensitive nature of Scricciolo's and Elia's work in UIL's international department included frequent and close contacts with Polish labor union *Solidarnosc* and its leader, Lech Walesa. Both spouses reportedly received monthly compensation from the Bulgarians for a variety of services ranging from information on Italian affairs and reports on Polish and U.S. labor union matters, on one hand, to organizing a network of Italian students in the United States for the purpose of acquiring political and technical data, on the other. They are also accused of providing the BR with similar information. With respect to espionage efforts against the United States, Elia appears to have carried out the primary role because of her trips to that country in conjunction with her official UIL duties. Both husband and wife, who have officially separated since their arrest, also spent time in Bulgaria.

Three Bulgarian diplomats identified by Scricciolo as enemy agents were transferred out of Italy by their own government before expulsion could take place. Each of them held secretarial rank at the Bulgarian Embassy in Rome. They are Simeon Georgiev Diytchnov, posted in 1972 and transferred in March of 1978, Ivan Tomov Dontchev, posted in December of 1978 and transferred in October of 1982, and Venelin Koumbiev, posted in December of 1978 and transferred in August of 1983.⁵

One final aspect of the Scricciolo/Elia case is addressed in the report made on December 20, 1982 by then Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio to the Parliament. According to the Minister, SISMI — the current Italian military intelligence service — monitors "all radio signals transmitted by the Bulgarian security services" in Italy. A major anomaly was noted "during the days of the abduction, captivity, and liberation of General Dozier." He went on to say that ". . . on the day of Dozier's liberation, there was a most singular transmission, totally exceptional, repeated several times. Counter-espionage believes that such type of transmission evidences a direct contact between the [Bulgarian] intelligence headquarters and an individual and specific agent in Italy."⁶

The second event of considerable interest is the plot to assassinate Walesa. According to the testimony of Mehmet Ali Agca — whose attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II will be discussed below — plans were underway, several months before the attack on the Pontiff

to eliminate Lech Walesa. The exploitable occasion designed for this act was intended to be Walesa's visit to Rome, hosted by Italy's major labor unions, from January 14 to 19, 1981. Significantly, in the same time frame, Agca himself was a hotel guest of the "Isa" residence in Rome under the assumed name of Faruk Ozgun as evidenced by a counterfeit passport which has since been confiscated by the Italian police authorities.

Operational planning commenced in December of 1981. At least one planning session relative to the plot was held in the home of Bulgarian diplomat Ivan Tomov Dontchev, whose name also appears in the Scricciolo/Elia case. Agca singled out Dontchev by means of photographic identification. The initial decision to use a direct armed attack (with handgun or rifle) was discarded in favor of explosive devices. Three sites in particular were considered: "The Pilgrim's Home," the Victoria Hotel, and the foreign press hall, all within Walesa's Roman itinerary which had been disclosed to the Bulgarians by a labor union official unknown to Agca. It has been determined that the person responsible for Walesa's itinerary was not Scricciolo, as initially suspected, but Salvatore Scordo, another UIL official, who is currently under investigation because of a substantial bank account not commensurate with his relatively modest earnings.

The third relevant case was the assassination attempt on Pope John Paul II. On May 13, 1981, while welcoming a multitude of pilgrims in St. Peter's Square,⁷ the Pope was fired upon twice at close range by Turkish national Mehmet Ali Agca, whose background includes militancy in a neo-Fascist organization known as the Grey Wolves and spasmodic travel in Eastern and Western Europe after his escape (it has been suggested that his escape was deliberately engineered) from a Turkish prison in November of 1979. The would-be assassin was immediately apprehended at the scene and sentenced to life imprisonment on July 27, 1981.⁸ Because of his totally uncooperative attitude throughout the trial, no material evidence regarding possible accomplices emerged at that time. Moreover, Agca did not even appeal the court's decision, but announced that he would initiate a hunger strike were he not released within five months — a statement generally interpreted from the very start as a warning to his behind-the-scenes principals. Police investigations continued.

As he had advised he would, Agca went on a hunger strike in December of 1981, but it was of brief duration. He also embarked upon the writing of a "memorial" and, in May of the following year (1982), his attitude toward the investigators became one of cooperation, so much so that his narration of facts, description of places, and photographic identification of principals and accomplices led to the indictment of seven foreign nationals, four Turks and three Bulgarians.

The role played by Agca's fellow Turks appears to be one of instigation and logistical support. During a sojourn of fifty days in Bulgaria, spanning from mid-July to the end of August of 1980, Agca

was offered a large sum of money by Turkish black marketeer Bekir Celenk to murder the Pope. Celenk further introduced him to three Bulgarians with whose assistance and guidance he was to carry out the agreed-upon mission. Another Turk, Omer Bagci, subsequently arrested in Switzerland and extradited to Italy, illegally introduced into Italian territory the 9mm. Browning automatic pistol used by Agca in St. Peter's Square, while Musa Cerdar Celebi, who has since been apprehended in Germany and extradited to Italy, furnished Agca with the necessary funds for his travels.⁹

The Bulgarians, on the other hand, appear to have been the planners and organizers of the assassination attempt. All three, who had been introduced to Agca in Sofia under assumed names, were actually posted in Rome. They are Sergei Ivanov Antonov, head of the Balkan Air airport office, Todor Stoyanov Ayzavov, treasurer of the Bulgarian Embassy, and Jelio Kolev Vassilev, secretary to the Bulgarian military attache. Although unfamiliar with their true names, Agca was able to furnish their telephone numbers, including an unlisted one, and to describe in detail Ayzavov's apartment and Antonov's car, in addition to accomplishing positive photographic identification. According to Agca, planning took place in Ayzavov's apartment, while on-the-ground reconnaissance was conducted on May 11 and 12, 1981, together with Antonov and Ayzavov, both of whom also accompanied the Turkish gunman to St. Peter's Square on the day of the attempt. Antonov, whose position as a Balkan Air employee does not include diplomatic immunity, was arrested on November 25, 1982. The other two Bulgarian nationals were transferred by their own government before expulsion could take place — a recurrent pattern.

Besides Agca's testimony — coupled with his identification of persons, objects, and places — circumstantial evidence tends to corroborate Bulgarian involvement. First, in his report of December 22, 1982, to the Parliament, the Defense Minister stated that the Bulgarian radio signal anomalies monitored by Italian intelligence during the Dozier captivity were also recorded within the time frame of the attempt on the Pope.¹⁰ Second, on September 8, 1982, well before Agca's revelations led to Antonov's arrest, Bulgaria embarked upon a preemptive program to discredit the Turk's confessions. On that date, the Bulgarian news agency BTA reported that "... we would not be surprised if some day, upon suggestion or reward, Agca were to state that he was tasked by the Bulgarians to kill the Pope."¹¹

Third, even prior to BTA's commentary, as the "Bulgarian connection" was beginning to surface in the Italian media, on August 27, 1982, the Bulgarian police arrested two Italian tourists on charges of espionage: Paolo Farsetti, an employee of an Arezzo (Tuscany) firm and local labor union representative, and his girl friend Gabriella Trevisin. They were sentenced to prison terms of ten years and three years respectively, by a Sofia court on April 14, 1982. Its decision was upheld by an appellate court four months later on August 4th. Ac-

ording to the "reasoning" of both courts, the couple's overt taking of photographs of the exterior of military barracks constitutes a crime against Bulgarian national security. In substance, the jailing of Farsetti and Trevisin gave and continues to give the Bulgarian government bargaining power. Finally, a more recent development, whose connection to the Papal assassination plot is under investigation, involves the disappearance of a 15-year old Vatican citizen and resident, Emanuela Orlandi, daughter of a Papal messenger.¹²

Orlandi was last seen on June 22, 1983 at approximately 7 p.m. in front of a bus stop near her music school in Rome. Six days later, Orlandi's relatives and friends had hundreds of wall posters printed displaying her picture and listing a Vatican telephone number so that anyone having pertinent information could contact the girl's family. The following Sunday, the Pope himself made an appeal from his balcony on St. Peter's Square during the customary greeting of Romans and pilgrims.

On July 5th, suspiciously late with respect to standard kidnapping procedures, a caller claimed that the girl had been abducted and would be released only in exchange for Mehmet Ali Agca. Since then, contradictory and deliberately unclear telephone calls, "communiques," and deadlines have been received by the family, the family's lawyer, the Vatican, and the Italian media. The self-styled abductors, who appear or wish to appear of diverse nationalities, have displayed in some respects an intimate knowledge of the girl, but have failed to prove that she is still alive. For his part, Agca has disassociated himself from any unlawful efforts to obtain his freedom.

The investigators are working on various hypotheses, including the possibility that the demand for Agca's release may not be issuing from kidnappers but from elements interested in exploiting her disappearance after having learned that Orlandi is a Vatican citizen — in other words, a follow-up on hostile clandestine endeavors.¹³

The fourth and final aspect of the Bulgarian/Italian connection involves the illicit marketing of weapons. In the course of a judicial investigation initiated in Trent, a municipality in northern Italy, a number of Italian and foreign nationals have been arrested. Relative to this, the Defense Minister has stated that "... counter-espionage has ascertained that ... an important structure is provided by Kintex, a Bulgarian state-owned import-export company, whose presence has been noted in all significant traffic in this field."¹⁴ The Minister specifically referred to a lot of Baretta "7.65" pistols manufactured in Italy and sold to Bulgaria, subject to a no-transfer-to-third-parties international trade clause. These weapons were subsequently found in the hands of Turkish terrorists. One of the purposes behind this illegitimate trade is the acquisition of valuable foreign currency needed by Bulgaria for various types of operations. It also explains her contacts with individuals such as Turkish nationals Bekir Celenk and Mehmet Ali Agca.

As best as it can be established from the public record, the conduct of *major* clandestine operations by the Bulgarian intelligence services in Italy is a departure for the Bulgarians. Yet, it would be unforgivably naive to consider the "Bulgarian connection" as the offspring of independent Bulgarian decision-making. Various indicators point in a different direction.

Bulgarian as well as Soviet defectors have testified that foreign operations are assigned to the Bulgarian intelligence establishment by its Soviet "mentors."¹⁵ Moreover, the hostile acts falling under the heading of the "Bulgarian connection" bear no correlation whatsoever to particular Bulgarian national interests, be they strategic, political, or economic. More significantly, the "Bulgarian connection" is in many ways reminiscent of the structures and patterns adopted by the USSR and the Soviet-dominated East European Communist bloc for clandestine operations on the Italian peninsula since the end of World War II. The following cases offer comparative terms of reference. First, the Communist bloc countries have consistently posted disproportionately large diplomatic missions in relation to their legitimate needs in Italy. The *diplomatic personnel* lists indicate the current figures: USSR — 44, Czechoslovakia — 19, Bulgaria — 15, Poland — 17, German Democratic Republic — 16, Hungary — 16, and Romania — 15. These numbers do not include adjunct *technical personnel* enjoying more limited diplomatic immunity.¹⁶ Since 1945, at least 61 Communist bloc diplomats have been expelled or barred from re-entering Italy.¹⁷ Further, for clandestine purposes, the Communist bloc has availed itself of non-diplomatic personnel operating under a commercial cover. Most recently, on February 15, 1983, the Carabinieri arrested Viktor Pronin, deputy manager of the Rome commercial office of Aeroflot, the Soviet airlines, on charges of military and technological espionage.

Communist bloc objectives in Italy traditionally include the Vatican as well as Catholic institutions in general. As far back as 1952, it was discovered that Father Alighieri Tondi, a professor at the Gregorian Academy in Rome, was in fact a Soviet agent. More recently, in 1975, it was determined that former priests Jeroslav Vojetch and Frantisek Krusik had been 'infiltrated' into the Collegio Nepomuceno, the Vatican's Czech institute in Rome. According to a Czech defector, Radio Vatican has been the object of special Communist bloc surveillance.¹⁸

Italian labor unions likewise attract continued Soviet interest. Documentation issuing from the Central Council of Soviet Labor Unions reflects plans for the periodic exchange of delegations with the Italian unions at all levels to discuss such topics as "scientific and technological progress." Connected to this program is the "mating," through joint labor union efforts, of Italian and Soviet cities, for example, Genoa-Odessa, Milan-Leningrad, Venice-Tallin, Livorno-Novosibirsk, and Palermo-Tiflis. All of these Italian cities are major industrial centers, important sea-ports, or both.¹⁹

Italy's territory has frequently been used as a base for espionage operations that extend beyond her boundaries. The most notorious case concerned Soviet recruitment of civilian parachutist Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri, who became, until his arrest in 1967, a leading operative in a spy network stretching from Europe to Africa.²⁰ Moreover, Italy served as an intermediary station to finance subversion in Spain and South America in the mid-1960s. Funds earmarked for this purpose originated in Prague and passed through Trieste and Milan.²¹

Several Italian organizations have been the recipients of "subsidies" from Communist bloc countries. The Italian Communist Party still acquires part of its revenue from commissions on trade with the Warsaw Pact countries.²² The Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) was heavily financed by Moscow since its birth in 1964, to the point of losing all political independence.²³ In 1978, the Milan branch of the Autonomy, a grouping of the extreme left with terrorist tendencies, received financial assistance from the Czech motor company Skoda.²⁴

Recruitment for clandestine operations does not necessarily depend upon ideological affinity. "Interlocutors" of Communist bloc agents in Italy frequently include mercenary-minded individuals, as in most industrial espionage cases,²⁵ as well as individuals with a rightist background, such as the above-mentioned Giorgio Rinaldi Ghislieri and his wife Angela Maria Antoniola.

Innocent Italian nationals have more than once been subjected to arrest for bargaining purposes. In 1967, Hungarian commercial representative Ferenc Budaj, who was convicted of espionage by the Court of Assizes of Milan, had to be released in exchange for Professor Giovanni Gambelli, head of the Italian Cultural Institute in Budapest, who was arrested on trumped-up charges by the Hungarian police. As recently as July of 1983, the above-mentioned Soviet spy Viktor Pronin was released on bail reportedly to put an end to the specious detention — short of arrest — in the Soviet Union of Luigi Vismara, the Moscow correspondent of Milan's *Il Giorno*, and of two other Italian citizens.²⁶

Finally, Communist bloc clandestine operations have a long history of linkage with terrorist activity on the Italian peninsula. In the late 1940s, both Yugoslavia — before her break from the Soviet fold — and Czechoslovakia were providing safehaven and paramilitary training to hundreds of Italian Communists and former partisans. At the beginning of the 1960s, Czech intelligence surreptitiously aided violent Germanic separatist aspirations in the Trentino-Alto Adige region of northern Italy. In the early 1970s, three fugitive Italian terrorists of the left found refuge and employment in Czechoslovakia. At least four additional leading elements of Italy's Communist-inspired terrorist fringe spent time in that country, as intelligence reports were disclosing the presence of special training sites in Doupov, Karlovy Vary, Smokovec, Bratislava, Lidice, and Leda. Later in the

decade, Czech keys were confiscated in a captured Red Brigades safe house in the Rome area.²⁷

A number of factors account for Communist bloc targeting of Italy through the years. Her strategic position in the Mediterranean, her politico-military posture in NATO's southern flank, her significance as the seventh most industrialized nation, and the site of the Papacy make Italy a *lucrative* target. At the same time, endemic political crises, governmental instability, socio-economic upheavals, and the presence of the largest non-ruling Communist Party in the world make Italy a *vulnerable* target.

Within this context, the emergence of the "Bulgarian connection" is all the more sinister as it coincides, by various indicators, with noteworthy developments in the areas of Italian internal affairs and Italian foreign policy. In retrospect, major Bulgarian penetration efforts can be detected just as the Italian law enforcement agencies started to neutralize the terrorist formations that had ravaged Italy's socio-political landscape for a decade and as the Italian Government was assuming unprecedented foreign policy and military commitments.

In late 1979, Italy actively supported the NATO decision to deploy the modernized theatre nuclear force (TNF) — the "Euromissiles" — which, among other things, authorized the installation of 112 cruise missiles in the town of Comiso in Sicily. On September 15, 1980, Italy signed a treaty with Malta guaranteeing the protection of her neutrality.²⁸ In March of 1982, Italy contributed a small detachment and three minesweepers to the multinational peace-keeping force in the Sinai. The following September, she sent a contingent of 2200 men to Lebanon to participate in the multinational peace-keeping forces there. In October, the Defense Minister announced that Italy's defenses in the south would be upgraded, a departure from a policy that in substance assessed the potential military threat as limited to Italy's northeastern frontiers.²⁹

These developments are being challenged, through "passive resistance," "civil disobedience," and other illegal means, by an articulate peace movement that is particularly active in Comiso, where the preparatory work is already underway to host the cruise missiles. Significantly, the Comiso "rallying point" is attracting protesters of various nationalities and drawing foreign financing. Both the official Italian Communist Party and other groups more openly taking Soviet-inspired positions are lending various types of support to the pacifist effort.³⁰

In the light of the Communist bloc's well-documented record of clandestine involvement in Italy, the nature and timing of the "Bulgarian connection" cannot but lead to the conclusion that Bulgaria's role is merely that of a "surrogate" of the Soviet Union in the accomplishment of anti-Western designs. Given the low profile traditionally maintained by Sofia's agents in Italy — in keeping with the above-

discussed, slow-paced relationship between the two countries — the Soviet tasking of that Balkan state with what has turned out to be the “Bulgarian connection” wholly meets the standards of the clandestine craft.

Footnotes

1. *Il Tempo* (Rome), December 12, 1982, p. 14.
2. *L'Espresso* (Rome), December 19, 1982, p. 11.
3. For a detailed account of the incident and relative aftermath, see Vinicio Araldi, *Guerra segreta in tempo di pace* (Milano: Mursia, 1969), pp. 302-305.
4. The account of the Scricciolo/Elia case appearing in the text is drawn from a survey of Italian dailies and weeklies since the beginning of press coverage. Various reconstructions have appeared in all major Italian dailies on July 28 and 29, 1983 on the occasion of Elia's second arrest, after she had provisionally been released because of health reasons.
5. All three names have been reported by the press. Consultation of the most recent official diplomatic register, *Ambasciate e Legazioni Estere in Italia*, published by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 1982, indicates that Dontchev and Koumbiev are listed as second secretaries and confirms their posting dates.
6. *Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Discussioni*, Seduta del 20 Dicembre 1982, Edizione non definitiva, pp. 44-45.
7. St. Peter's Square is an integral part of the State of the Vatican City, the smallest sovereign state in the community of nations. Geographically, this State is totally located in Rome. Whereas no barrier separates St. Peter's Square from the rest of Rome, access to the remainder of the Vatican is controlled by the Pope's Swiss Guard.
8. Pursuant to bilateral agreements between the Vatican and Italy, jurisdiction over certain crimes committed within the Vatican is delegated to the Italian courts. Agca was consequently tried by the Court of Assizes of Rome.
9. Bagci confessed. Celebi has denied ever meeting Agca, but admits knowing Celenk. The fourth Turk, whose role in the plot remains unclear at this writing, is Oral Celik.
10. Above, note 6, p. 44.
11. Quotation reported in above note 6, pp. 43-44.
12. The resident population of the Vatican comprises 406 persons. Therefore, the small number of citizens/residents potentially makes them valuable targets for clandestine operations.
13. The hypothesis that it may be a kidnapping for ransom has been discarded because of several considerations: (1) no ransom appears to have been demanded at any time; (2) Emanuela's father, who supports a family of seven, earns a modest salary; (3) if the Vatican itself were to pay a ransom for a kidnapped citizen, it would establish too dangerous a precedent.
14. Above, note 6, pp. 44.
15. Testimony to that effect has recently been rendered by Stefan Svredlev, Iordan Mantarov, and Vladimir Sakharov. See *Avanti!* (Rome), December 22, 1982, p. 4, *La Repubblica* (Rome), March 24, 1983, p. 12, and *L'Espresso* (Rome), December 12, 1982, p. 9.
16. See publication cited in above note 5.
17. This figure includes 35 Soviets, 9 Hungarians, 7 Bulgarians, 6 Czechs, 2 Romanians, and 2 Albanians (prior to Albania's break from the Soviet fold). Since no official statistics have been released, data of this nature can be reconstructed only from parliamentary debates and press accounts, which are not likely to be complete. A

- recommendation made by Italian intelligence to expell 22 Soviets (only one of whom did not enjoy diplomatic cover) was turned down by the Italian Government in 1972 because of political considerations. The list appears in *Il Settimanale* (Rome), May 2, 1979, p. 33. It is also worth noting that in his book, *KGB* (New York: Readers' Digest Press, 1974), John Barron lists no less than 140 Soviet citizens engaged in clandestine operations in Italy, under diplomatic as well as non-diplomatic cover, from 1946 until publication of his research work.
18. United States Senate, Committee in the Judiciary, *Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Security Laws*, November 18, 1975.
 19. See *OP* (Rome), September 19, 1978, pp. 9-11 and September 26, 1978, pp. 23-24. These articles include photographs of pertinent Soviet documents.
 20. For a detailed account of this case, see work cited in above note 3, pp. 291-292.
 21. Reported by Giancarlo Galli, *Eminenza Rossa* (Milan: Sugar Co., 1976).
 22. See Achille Albonetti, *Il Finanziamento del PCI* (Rome: Circolo Stato e Libertà, 1978).
 23. For the history of PSIUP, including its financial sources, see Silvano Miniati, *PSIUP, 1964-1972, Vita e Morte di un Partito* (Edimez, 1982). The author is a former PSIUP activist.
 24. See *L'Espresso* (Rome), February 8, 1981, p. 12 and *Panorama* (Milan), September 15, 1980, p. 43.
 25. Most known cases of this nature are reported in the work cited in above note 3.
 26. Two detailed accounts complement each other: *L'Espresso* (Rome), August 7, 1983, pp. 6-8 and *La Repubblica* (Rome) August 3, 1983, p. 5.
 27. For a more detailed discussion of Soviet and satellite involvement in Italian terrorism, as well as other clandestine endeavors in Italy, prior to the emergence of the "Bulgarian connection," see Vittorio S. Pisano, *Communist Bloc Covert Action: The Italian Case* (Gaithersburg, Maryland: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1981).
 28. It was ratified by the Italian Parliament on April 15 of the following year.
 29. This new defensive posture takes into account Libyan hostile actions. See Vittorio S. Pisano, "Libya's Foothold in Italy," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1982), pp. 179-182.
 30. No comprehensive work has as yet appeared on pacifist agitation in Italy. The most detailed accounts at the level of periodicals appear in the weeklies *L'Espresso* (Rome) and *Panorama* (Milan). For a discussion of the TNF issue with particular reference to Italy and some treatment of Soviet clandestine intervention, see Renato Proni, *Euromissili: La Tua Scelta* (Milano: Sugar Co., 1982).