Vol. XVII No. 1, Spring 1997

Endnotes

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the policies or views of any agency or department of the United States Government.

1. Philippe Gaillard and Hamid Barrada, "The Story Direct from the Habyarimana Family," Jeune Afrique, 29 April 1994, pp. 12-19. Although no formal investigation has occurred, nor is one likely, UNAMIR eyewitnesses and an informal investigation by several UNAMIR Headquarters staff officers state that Hutu extremists, probably elements of the Presidential Guard, shot down the plane.
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2. "Genocide in Rwanda, April-May 1994,"Human Rights Watch, Africa, 6 (4) May 1994, 13 pages, mimeographed.
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3. "Operation Genocide," New African, July/August 1994, p. 13.
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4. Stephen J. Stedman, "Alchemy for a New World Order: Overselling 'Preventive Diplomacy'," Foreign Affairs, 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), p. 14. He adds on p. 16, "To be successful preventive diplomacy requires prescience, prescription, and mobilization," which he explains in detail in the rest of the work.
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5. Ibid., p. 18.
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6. Ibid.
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7. The civil war began in 1990 and a brief period of peace developed with the signing of the Arusha Accords. The war continues as the Hutu former government forces (ex-FAR) and the predominantly Tutsi insurgents have switched places. The war did not end with the fall of Kigali on 4 July 1994, nor with the flight of the Rwandan military. The ex-FAR wage a low level insurgency primarily in western Rwanda from bases in Zaire. They continue to destabilize the Great Lakes Region as they also assist Hutu rebels in Burundi.

Furthermore, many observers have yet to realize that the RPF has initiated a revolution in the Skocpolian sense sociopolitical transformation due to actual change of state and class structures. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Boston, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 5. However, unlike in Skocpol's analyses, the current Rwandan revolution did not stem from class-based revolts from below, but rather from an externally based invasion. The author bases this observation on numerous conversations with members of the RPF's inner circle, the ones leading and guiding the revolution. The revolution is less than two years old and is not the focus of this study.
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8. See Rene Lemarchand, Rwanda and Burundi (1970); and Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda crisis, 1959-1994: History of Genocide (1995) for detailed histories of the ethnic conflict in Rwanda.
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9. Gerard Prunier, "Intellectuels Africains," Politique Africaine 51, CNRS, Center for African Research, DIA translation, 9 July 1994, p. 19.
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10. "Arming Rwanda: The Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses in the Rwandan War," Human Rights Watch Arms Project (New York and Washington, DC, January 1994).
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11. "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity International Support for the Perpetrators of Rwandan Genocide," Human Rights Watch Arms Project (New York and Washington, DC, May 1995). The FAR continued to receive arms shipments via Goma, Zaire after the UN imposed an arms embargo in May 1994.
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12. Joan Kakwenzire and Dixon Kamukama, "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in Rwanda: 1990-1994," (Kampala, Uganda: Department of History, Makerere University, November 1995), p. 43.
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13. Ibid, p. 43. Additionally, a highly reliable military source told the author that UNAMIR staff officers reported seeing French trainers at Kanombe Barracks, the Para-Commando base in Kigali, after French troops departed in December 1993. These instructors trained the Para-Commandos in terrorist and insurgent methods and tactics.
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14. The 54 man OAUNMOG had been created in August 1992 to monitor the ceasefire between the FAR and RPA.
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15. Interview with a Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) officer who served as the Secretary to the OAUNMOG concerning his role as military observer and his comments on conditions in Rwanda, specifically along the demilitarized zone created by the August 1992 ceasefire in November 1994.
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16. The RPF party program desires to break the historic cycle of ethnic violence which has been perpetuated for the past thirty years, primarily by manipulation of historic fact and mythology. See Africa Rights, Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (London, September 1994), for a good history of the Rwandan Civil War. It provides insight into the roots of the RPF and the dynamics of Hutu extremism.
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17. The proposed national military would contain 13,000 in the Army and 6,000 in the Gendarmerie.
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18. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Dar es Salaam Radio Tanzania External Service, in English, 1600 GMT, 4 August 1993.
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19. UNOMUR was established by the 22 June 1993 UN Security Council Resolution 846 following charges by Rwanda that Uganda was aiding the RPA. The Uganda government had repeatedly denied the accusations and called for the creation of a neutral multi-national force to monitor the two countries' common border. UNOMUR began operating in Uganda on 12 October 1993. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Paris AFP, in English, 1726 GMT, 13 October 1993. Meanwhile, OAUNMOG II, which increased the size of the 54 man OAUNMOG to 132 in August 1993, monitored the demilitarized zone (DMZ) in northern Rwanda which separated the RPA and FAR. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French, 1115 GMT, 23 October 1993. UNOMUR did not become fully absorbed into UNAMIR until after April 1994, while OAUNMOG was integrated into UNAMIR shortly after its activation and arrival in Rwanda.
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20. Text on UN Security Council Resolution 872, adopted 5 October 1993.
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21. The fundamental difference between a Chapter VI and a Chapter VII mandate is the peacekeeping force's ability to use force. Under a Chapter VI mandate peacekeepers can only use force in self-defense, while under a Chapter VII they can be proactive in the use of force. In fact, they can make peace if the situation warrants it. A Chapter VII involves more risk to the peacekeeping contingents because the likelihood of combat, and hence casualties, are higher; therefore the UN prefers Chapter VI mandates and its variations over Chapter VII mandates. Furthermore, Chapter VI mandates require the consent of all disputing factions, while Chapter VII mandates do not.
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22. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale del Republique Rwandaise, in French, 1115 GMT, 6 August 1993.
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23. The RPF has demonstrated its willingness to abide by the Arusha Accords by using them loosely when setting up the institutions of the new Rwanda government. The current broad-based

government dominated by the RPF used the Arusha Accords as a guide when allocating ministry positions and seats in the National Assembly. However, the RPF changed the distribution of power within the government to ensure its dominance. In fact, the prime minister and all the assignments except for the posts reserved for the Mouvement Republicain National pour la Democratie et le Developpement (MRND), President Habyarimana's party, and one post allocated to the Liberal Party follow the accords. In fact, even during the cabinet reshuffle of August 1995 the allocated positions remained in the hands of the ousted minister's respective parties. The RPF took three out of the five MRND slots, understandably given their military victory. An independent Hutu holds the Liberal Party's post. Furthermore, Arusha is used as the guide for the integration of former government soldiers (Forces Armees Rwandaises or FAR) into the RPA, albeit the positions are reversed and each faction's percentage of the force eliminated. RPA officers fill slots that were supposed to go to the FAR and vice versa. For example, the Chief of Staff of the Army was a FAR slot with the deputy going to the RPA. Currently, an RPA officer is the Chief of Staff and his deputy former FAR. Conversely, the RPA would have had the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie and now it is filled by the former FAR commander of the Gendarmerie with an RPA deputy. Command of brigades and battalions is based on merit and recently integrated FAR officers are proving themselves invaluable in fighting the insurgency. There is no power-sharing so to speak in the Army. "A New Order in Kigali," Africa Confidential, 35, no. 17 (26 August 1994), p. 3; and State Department cable, Amembassy Kigali, Subject: Prime Minister-Designate Names Government, 21144Z March 1994.
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24. State Department cable, Amembassy Kigali, Subject: Rwandans Remain Skeptical of Peace Prospects, 04150Z August 1993.
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25. N. Gordon, Murders in the Mist (London, 1993); and Gaillard and Barrada, "The Story direct from the Habyarimana Family," provide detailed information of these mafia-like activities.
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26. Kakwenzire and Kamukama, "Development and Consolidation," pp. 39-43.
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27. Ibid., p. 39.
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28. Ibid.
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29. Prunier, "Intellectuels Africains," p. 18.
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30. "Genocide in Rwanda, April-May 1994," Human Rights Watch Africa, 6 (4) May 1994; and Rwanda, Despair and Defiance.
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31. Umrava, no. 10, 28 August, pp. 5-8.
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32. Interview with ZNA officer who served as Secretary to OAUMOG, November 1994.
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33. Ibid.
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34. FBIS LONDON UK, Paris Radio France International, in French, 0545 GMT, 22 April 1994.
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35. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Paris AFP, in English, 1451 GMT, 6 October 1993.
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36. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura in Kinyarwanda to Rwanda, 0415 GMT, 14 October 1993. Radio Muhabura was the RPF Clandestine Radio Station. The Kinihira Agreement was a prelude to the Arusha negotiations which gave the RPF the same rights and recognition as the other Rwandan political parties.
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37. The method used to kill the candidate is similar to that of the interahamwe. The RPA tend to shoot its victims.
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38. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French,1115 GMT, 21 November 1993.
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39. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French,1115 GMT, 26 November 1993.
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40. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French,1115 GMT, 18 November 1993.
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41. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, in French to Rwanda, 1815 GMT, 19 November 1993.
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42. See "Genocide in Rwanda, April-May 1994;" Rwanda, Despair and Defiance; Filip Reyntjens, Donnees sur les escadrons de la mort au Rwanda, Antwerp, 9 October 1992. Reyntjens concluded based on research conducted in Rwanda that attacks to eliminate the opposition by government death squads which began in late 1991 with subsequent attacks in Bugesera in March 1992, and in Kibuye in August 1992, served as smaller "dress rehearsals" for things to come and constituted attempts by extremists to sabotage the democratization process. Additional attacks occurred in the north and west in December 1992 and January 1993.
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43. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French,1800 GMT, 4 January 1994.
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44. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Paris AFP, in English, 1440 GMT, 31 January 1994.
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45. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, in English to Rwanda, 1990 GMT, 23 February 1994.
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46. FBIS LONDON, Paris Radio France International, in French, 1830 GMT, 22 February 1994.
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47. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French, 1115 GMT, 18 March 1994.
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48. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in French, 1444 GMT, 16 March 1994.
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49. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels de Morgen, in Dutch, 9 March 1994.
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50. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, in French to Rwanda, 1040 GMT, 30 April 1994.
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51. James Fenton, "A Short History of Anti-Hamitism," New York Review, 15 February 1996, p. 8. A review of Gerard Prunier's book The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide.
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52. While the idea of struggle for control of Africa based on culture and language (with economic undertones) has little meaning for English speaking peoples, especially Americans, it serves as a motivating force for many French who see the loss of their Empire to the British beginning with the end of the Seven Years War in 1763, continuing at Waterloo in 1815 and subsequent losses of world power as a result of the Franco-Prussian War and World Wars I and II. The British and German monarchies were tied by blood and Britain and Prussia were allies in the Seven Years War.
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53. State Department Cable, Amembassy Kigali, 311308Z August 1993, Subject: The French Military and the Neutral International Force (NIF).
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54. See "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity," for specific details.
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55. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Paris AFP, in English, 2216 GMT, 30 November 1993.
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56. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, "UN Force Commander Interviewed on Security and Transition," London BBC World Service, in English,1705 GMT, 23 February 1994.
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57. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in Dutch, 1314 GMT, 17 February 1994. It should be noted that Booh-Booh had been accused of having close ties with and was possibly colluding with the government. Furthermore, in the days following Habyarimana's assassination Booh-Booh's actions displayed his incompetence as his reports to the Office of the Secretary General were full of misinformation. That said, these remarks clearly were on target.
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58. Colette Braeckman, "Colonel Marchal Rejects Prosecution Accusations," Brussels Le Soir, in French, 9 January 1996, p. 4; and FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Groot-Bijgaarden de Standaard, in Dutch, 2 January 1996, p. 8.
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59. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in Dutch, 1314 GMT, 17 February 1994.
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60. Johan Cruppens Commentary: "Violence in Rwanda Threat to Region," FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Antwerp Gazet Van Antwerpen, in Dutch, 24 February 1994.
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61. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in French, 1445 GMT, 16 March 1994.
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62. Ibid.
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63. Ibid.
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64. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in French, 1214 GMT, 10 March 1994.
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65. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels, Le Soir, in French, 21 March 1994, interview with Faustin Twagiramungu.
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66. FBIS BRUSSELS BE, Brussels BELGA, in Dutch, 1941 GMT, 28 March 1994.
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67. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, Kigali Radiodiffusion Nationale de la Republique Rwandaise, in French, 1115 GMT, 3 April 1994.
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68. FBIS ABIDJAN IV, London BBC World Service, in English, 1705 GMT, 23 February 1994. Dallaire at a debriefing in Washington, DC in October 1994 stated that his force was ill-equipped to stop the renewed fighting and subsequent genocide, even prior to the departure of the Belgian and Bangladesh contingents.
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69. Breckman, "Colonel Marchal Rejects Prosecution Accusations," p. 4; and Filip Reyntjens, "Rwanda: Background to Genocide," December 1995, pp. 14-15.
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70. "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity."
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71. Ruth Marcus, "Clinton Seeks Limits on Peace Keeping," The Washington Post, 28 September 1993 as found in Milton Leitenberg, "Rwanda, 1994: International Incompetence produces Genocide," Peacekeeping and International Relations, November/December 1994.
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72. "Home Truths about Genocide," Financial Times, Weekend, 13-14 January 1996, Books, Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, 1959-1994. History of a Genocide.

We must note that in January and February 1996, the UN raised the possibility of a military intervention force for Burundi which probably stems from the international community's collective guilt over having watched Rwanda's Genocide. However, the causes of the ethnically based political turmoil and the current situation in Burundi are totally different. Furthermore, the first, second and third variables are missing, yet preventive diplomacy is the tool of choice and is expected to succeed. More importantly still, the international community has little will to use force, despite calls for it, which in this case would not uphold a negotiated settlement, but could plunge Burundi into the massive ethnic slaughter that such an intervention wants to prevent.
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73. The author agrees with journalist assessments that the shooting down of the president's aircraft was a calculated event used to remove Habyarimana from the scene and to ignite the genocide. Extremists viewed him as too soft and feared that he would soon implement portions of the Arusha Accords. Gaillard and Barrada, "The Story Direct from the Habyarimana Family," pp. 12-19.