

Book Reviews

Richelson, Jeffrey T. *The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology*. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001.

Jeffrey Richelson has captured the untold story of a little-known side of modern intelligence gathering. Ian Fleming's James Bond has done a disservice to full understanding of the trade of foreign intelligence gathering by creating a popular genre quite removed from today's reality. The modern world of intelligence practitioners is more apt to be made up of scientists, technicians, IT specialists, and just plain old-fashioned bureaucrats than tuxedo-clad, debonair gentlemen asking for martinis – shaken not stirred, please. One distinct group among today's intelligence collectors is the engineers and scientists who employ knowledge and skills in the pursuit of intelligence. This is their story.

Richelson describes how science and technology are harnessed to capture information about America's adversaries. His account runs the gamut of the CIA's employment of technology to gain access to intelligence not otherwise available. It is the tale of applying science to espionage. It begins with the creation in 1949 of the CIA's Scientific Intelligence Committee and continues until today's Directorate of Science and Technology. At times it is the story of office intrigue and a lot of bureaucratic infighting, partly arising from lack of knowledge about the full potential of applying scientific rigour to espionage, as well as the more mundane reason of seeking to gain control over a lot of research dollars.

Richelson tells the story through chapters generally organized around each of the heads of the CIA's office of wizardry. This approach works well and captures a remarkable tale of overcoming seemingly insurmountable obstacles by employing the best brains in the nation, applying scientific knowledge, and using a great deal of money. The results are phenomenal. Spy planes produced in a short time and coming in under budget, and construction of a huge ocean-going crane capable of lifting an entire modern Soviet submarine. Some of the other ideas did not always work out, such as equipping carrier-pigeons with spy cameras.

Other initiatives captured advanced image-processing techniques, used in intelligence analysis, and applied them to mammography, and the fight against breast cancer. Lithium batteries for pacemakers were developed for the intelligence trade. Richelson describes how a large group of exceptionally talented people who brought their knowledge and skills to bear in America's spy wars. When today, satellite photographs assist the international community to identify those areas of Africa which will soon suffer from life-threatening droughts it is

because of the advances which were made in the name of intelligence gathering and financed by America's eternal quest for information.

Scientific intelligence has made a remarkable contribution to US (and Western) intelligence capabilities over its half century of existence. Collection systems have been enhanced and analytical activities have been made easier. The advances made possible by the people engaged in scientific intelligence collection have contributed to an almost incomprehensible increase in the volume of intelligence available for analysis. These same people were then tasked to devise novel ways of crunching that same information so that it may be made useful to the intelligence analysts.

Hidden between the lines of this informative book is the question of whether the great scientific intelligence gains of the past half century can be replicated in the future. Richelson seems to suggest that a unique environment existed in the second half of the twentieth century when great minds such as that of Edwin Land of Polaroid fame, could be brought into the intelligence community to devise novel solutions to complex problems. Today, the situation is possibly different. Richelson points out that the features which made the CIA office of wizardry unique by uniting brains, complex tasks, a sense of adventure, and large amounts of money, may no longer exist. Private sector technology is much more competitive and advanced today than at the dawn of scientific intelligence. In today's environment, the Directorate of Science and Technology is no longer driving the agenda, in Richelson's view. There has been a decline over the past several decades of exceptional innovations fostered by the American intelligence community – unless, of course, if they simply are not telling anyone!

This is a scholarly book. Richelson writes in a dry style geared to capturing as much information as possible. Sometimes the details are overwhelming and might have been balanced by an anecdote or two. But like all Richelson's books, this is the penultimate description of its subject.

Kurt F. Jensen is a PhD candidate in modern diplomatic history at Carleton University, Ottawa, where his thesis will look at the early history of Canadian foreign intelligence collection efforts. He is employed by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and has served in a number of assignments abroad.

Jeffreys-Jones, Rhodri. *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.

In the twenty-first century, the United States of America maintains the world's largest intelligence community. No other country has intelligence institutions that compare to its might and awesome powers. Some may argue its reach is ubiquitous at the international level. However, we must ask ourselves: how did the American intelligence community come into being, and how has it survived for so long? Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), who is a prolific academic writer on numerous subjects relating to American intelligence and national security, provides an explanation to these questions in his latest book entitled, *Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence*.

At first view, the title of this book may cause people to think that it is about intelligence and economic espionage. In fact, *Cloak and Dollar* is a critical, yet supportive historical view of the American intelligence community. The central theme of this book is based on a problem Jeffreys-Jones defines as the confidence man, or what is known as hyperbole/exaggeration. Confidence man can be seen as a syndrome that has allowed intelligence agencies to receive both greater collection powers and funding over the years. Simultaneously, Jeffreys-Jones uses the idea of confidence man as an explanation of how American intelligence agencies are rewarded for their failures. It is believed that the "lack of openness encourages exaggeration," which leads to the continuation of confidence man. (p. 98) Furthermore, he links this issue with the intrigue and peril of creating and managing intelligence agencies. For Jeffreys-Jones, the confidence man syndrome is a "chronic disease," not a "fatal condition." (p. 10)

The book is divided into 14 chapters and consists of 357 pages (including notes and index). Each chapter deals with the various intelligence agencies created by the American government, and major historical events that affected the country and intelligence agencies. *Cloak and Dollar* covers approximately 225 years of American history, beginning with George Washington and ending with the tragic events of 11 September 2001.

Jeffreys-Jones' use of historical analysis shines a light on key historical events. He explains that Allan Pinkerton's warning of a possible assassination plot against President Abraham Lincoln, "guaranteed him fame and fortune" for the future. (p. 30) In fact, Pinkerton provided intelligence reports that contained worse case scenario thinking, and exaggerated information "as much as three-fold." (p. 24) Chapter five deals with the U-1, the first agency created during peacetime and operated for a short period (1915-27). Unlike other intelligence agencies U-1 was never penetrated by enemy infiltration. However, the demise of U-1 is the possible result of its failure in "public relations and hyperbole" (confidence man) unlike the Pinkerton Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) who were very successful at it. (p. 77)

Other chapters focus on such issues as Pearl Harbor (1941), the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Security Council (NSC) report 68, Bay of Pigs, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the 1975 Church Commission. This list is only a small fraction of issues Jeffreys-Jones discusses in *Cloak and Dollar*.

The last chapter is devoted to issues that have arisen during the 1990s. Jeffreys-Jones reminds us that in the post-Cold War era there were many calls to abolish the CIA, and place its components inside the State Department. (p. 259) At the same time, outbreak of intelligence “turf wars” began between the FBI and CIA over foreign intelligence operations. (p. 261) In 1997, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), George Tenet confirmed for the first time the intelligence community’s budget as \$26.6 billion. (p. 275) The chapter ends with the events of 11 September 2001. Jeffreys-Jones argues change is at hand “the situation was custom-made for the intelligence confidence man and his political allies. Once again, the cries were heard: give them more money; unleash the CIA.” (288)

What are the shortcomings of the *Cloak and Dollar*? The book fails to discuss several major recent events that have caused changes in both domestic and foreign intelligence operations, including the 1993 attempt at destroying the World Trade Organization; the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 American embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya; and the 1998 Tomahawk missile attack in Sudan, where the CIA failed to provide accurate intelligence to the military. Jeffreys-Jones analysis of these events and their linkages to confidence men would have further enhanced the last chapter. These omissions are understandable since such discussion would have increased the size of the book over 500 pages.

In conclusion, despite the shortcomings, *Cloak and Dollar* is an asset for any academic course on intelligence and national security. What differentiates this book from other is its central theme of “confidence man,” and relating it to the development of American intelligence agencies. In the end, *Cloak and Dollar* not only enhances intelligence and national security studies, but also opens up a new area of research involving the confidence man syndrome.

Harjit Singh Virdee is a MA candidate in International Studies at the University of Northern British Columbia.

Herman, Michael. *Intelligence Services in the Information Age*. London: Frank Cass, 2001.

University students are often told that they don't live in reality. They work, live and play in a world that routinely fails to consider realities such as budgets, public opinion, elections, and other aspects of the "real world." However, occasionally the immensely wide chasm between academia and reality is linked by a well-written text that allows students of a specific subject to understand the importance of incorporating reality with theory. For the young academic subject of intelligence, Michael Herman's *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* is such a text.

Herman continues to impress readers by offering exclusive insight into Cold War intelligence and examining the British Intelligence Services, their problems, and arguments for reform. The text is comprised of a number of independent papers which when combined expose the reader to an accurate picture of the intelligence community. Since publication, many of Herman's topics have been discussed in a variety of different publications and while they do provide some insight, many intelligence professionals or students of the subject are familiar with the points raised by Herman. Problems, such as inter-service rivalry and lack of constructive communication between foreign and domestic intelligence services, are known to have contributed to the general intelligence failure of 11 September 2001.

Of particular interest is Chapter 9 entitled "The Cold War: Did Intelligence Make a Difference?" While considering the effects of intelligence in the Cold War, two schools of thought are outlined by Herman. He outlines that Cold War intelligence either produced a better understanding of enemy intentions and developments and thus reduced the possibility of misinterpretation, or intensified the confrontation between East and West. While the academic debate over this chapter will no doubt produce some heated discussions, individuals or countries who suffered a direct loss from such incidents as the shoot down of Korean Airlines Flight 007 will have a negative opinion of Cold War intelligence successes. The value of this chapter for university classes presents itself in the endless debate the section can trigger.

By far, the most engaging chapter to this reviewer is Herman's discussion of Intelligence and International Ethics in Chapter 13. Ethics and intelligence is a combination seldom seen. This rarity can be attributed to the nature of the clandestine services, but Herman expertly illustrates the relationship between the perils of information gathering and the assurances provided by the gathered information. The world of intelligence is one where the ends justify the means in the vast majority of cases. The cost-benefit analysis is up to the reader to decide. Herman further considers the domestic problems of intelligence services tailor-

ing their information or situations in such ways as to ensure increased expenditure thereby bringing their integrity into question.

The chapter on ethical behaviour continues by examining the idea of treating intelligence as an international commodity. The post-Cold War era has become an unstable and dangerous place. State to state relations are no longer the sole targets of intelligence services. Rogue or isolated nations, non-state actors and industrial espionage are threats that transcend international borders, ignore styles of government and threaten peace-loving nations. Treatment of intelligence as a commodity could place real strength behind increased intelligence cooperation.

Having enjoyed Herman's views and arguments one critique came to mind in reflecting on the content of this work. Those who either directly contribute to the intelligence services or study the academic subject, will generally agree with Herman's arguments and perspectives. However, perhaps a more simple and direct effort should have been placed on the overall benefits of intelligence to government decision makers. It is the decision makers who should be made to understand the uses and purpose of intelligence. We already know.

This book is particularly beneficial as a university level reader to both introduce a student to intelligence studies and to build on existing knowledge on the nature of intelligence. In very easy to understand language, Herman manages to help bridge the gap between academia and reality, theory and practice. Overall, *Intelligence Services in the Information Age* is an excellent source on British and Western intelligence. My only hope is that such a text becomes required reading for the decisionmaking executive of current governments who are threatening to unleash the dogs of war without first successfully establishing the basis for degrading mankind to warfare.

Miles Markovic completed a Master of Arts degree in political science at the University of Guelph in 2002. His graduate thesis examined the benefits and necessity of providing senior decision makers with timely and accurate intelligence on which to base their foreign policy decisions.

Tien, Hung-mao, and Tun-jen Cheng, eds. *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000, in cooperation with the Institute for National Policy Research, Taipei.

With international economic and political power shifting out of Europe, Asia, especially its Pacific rim, has emerged as the new global power center. This economic growth coupled with military tensions make the region the likely

playground of future power struggles among the principal players, namely the US, Russia, China, Japan, and the Koreans. Taking these into consideration, Taiwanese scholars Hung-mao Tien and Tun-jen Cheng have assembled an array of international experts and present a fascinating, detailed, and above all diverse analysis of the Asia-Pacific security environment.

With its growing economic power, military modernization, and political assertiveness coupled with unresolved historical territorial claims, the People's Republic of China (PRC) dominates much of the security debate in the region. Akio Watanabe identifies China as "the single most important determinant of future international relations" in the Asia-Pacific region. (p. 64)

At the same time, however, there is no consensus over Beijing's view of its world role. The inability of other powers to fathom China's intentions, as well as its capabilities, generates uncertainties and prevents them from developing an appropriate response or adequate strategy. Hence, nations, especially the US, seem to be wavering between containment and constructive engagement vis-à-vis PRC. The end of the Cold War significantly diminished the constructive part and, as Harvey Feldman amply highlights, American policy makers face a new dilemma: engagement versus containment or engagement with containment. As a result, Washington often looks for potential partners in Asia-Pacific who are apprehensive of Beijing. According to one of the contributors, Byron Weng, if it were to become a dominant superpower, "China may well endeavor to reintroduce a Pax Sinica, a new world order incorporating some features of the tribute system, in the name of peace and harmony perhaps, in the larger world." (p. 108) This perhaps is the apprehension of a number of countries of the region vis-à-vis China.

Against the background of these uncertainties over PRC, questions were often raised concerning American commitments to Asia-Pacific security, especially in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. For Ralph Cossa the future of the region "will be most influenced by the ability – or inability – of the United States, Japan and China to interact positively and peacefully with one another." (p. 40) One might perhaps add the Koreans to this list. Any deterioration of relations, let alone a collision, between any two players would adversely affect the regional balance and stability.

The US-Japan alliance is seen as a major stabilizer while US-Korean relations have certain inbuilt limitations, especially over China's role and response concerning unification of the Korean peninsula. China wields considerable influence over North Korea, has a stake in the stability of the peninsula, and has gained "substantive significance and influence." Hence, Kang Choi and Taeho Kim warn, "to minimize any negative influence from China, to engage China to be a constructive participant, and to strengthen China's position vis-à-vis North Korea, [South Korea] and the United States should approach China with a common stance." (p. 232)

The idea of Great China comprising China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, draws some attention though Byron Weng dismisses the idea of a wholly integrated Great China as “too far-fetched and uncertain.” (p. 97) However, his assertion that “China’s imperialism has been more cultural, rather than territorial or economic” or his claim that China has usually justified its territorial expansion “in terms of cultural superiority”(pp. 99-100) may not go well with a number of smaller countries in Asia, especially those countries who dispute China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

The Taiwan issue and the Chinese refusal to renounce force and to seek a peaceful and non-military solution pose a serious security threat and Michael Kau presents a detailed discussion of the missile crises of 1995 and 1996. The discussion on the territorial disputes in the South China Sea by Chien Chung is accompanied by a detailed list of islands and inlets that are in dispute. Besides the multilateral territorial disputes, the security environment impinges upon the safety of sea-lanes and exploitation of natural resources, and hence Chung warns that “tensions in the South China Sea are slowly but progressively worsening.” (p. 299)

The absence of a detailed discussion on Russia perhaps is the only drawback of this otherwise excellent volume. In short, Tien and Cheng have presented a commendable work where they not only examine the conflicting great power interests in the region but also highlight the internal tensions and differences within each of the principal players. The 18 contributions have been broadly arranged into three sections: great powers, regional cooperation, and flash-points. Hence, *The Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific* is a must for any student of international politics.

P.R. Kumaraswamy is an associate professor and teaches Contemporary Middle East at the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Polenberg, Richard ed. *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: the Security Clearance Hearing*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002.

The indispensable key to a good book review, I was once told, is always to begin it with an anecdote or droll observation of some sort. That way, one would capture the readership’s attention by doing away with their initial scepticism and, in so doing, make readers much more amenable to the commentary about to follow. “Psychology sells!” My old professor pointed his yellow pencil at me, arched his eyebrows, and smiled, not without a tinge of self-satisfaction at such

a pearl of wisdom. Comedy as a soporific: now that was a revelation, at least to a mere teenager like me at the time. “There are exceptions, of course,” he mumbled, turning once more to his book and seemingly forgetting my presence, something initially endearing but by now alarmingly customary.

He surely had works such as *In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer* in mind as the exceptions, for, try as I might, I could not bring myself to make light of anything to do with this piece of scholarship, one at once revealing, moving, and deeply disturbing. Adding further relevance to the work of Richard Polenberg – the Goldwin Smith Professor of American History at Cornell University – are some of the unnerving similarities between the situation in America post-11 September 2001 and that same country’s anti-communist crusade soon after the Second World War. Then, as now, many constitutionally enshrined rights and freedoms were hurriedly suspended or violated in the name of fighting an ill-defined and supposedly all-encompassing threat. Then, as now, fear and irrationality were deliberately stoked up by a select few, mainly for opportunistic political gain. Polenberg’s book – a vivid account of what can happen when the American people allow government to run roughshod over civil liberties in the name of national security – has many timely and salutary lessons for the present.

For four weeks in April and May 1954, over 30 witnesses testified at Dr. Robert Oppenheimer’s hearing before the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC) Personnel Security Board. He had requested this enquiry to defend himself against accusations of communist sympathies and opposition to the continued development of America’s atomic arsenal while heading the Manhattan Project. Such allegations had resulted in his security clearance being revoked on 3 December 1953 by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Only three weeks later was Oppenheimer informed of this and told that he had two options: appeal the suspension or end his contract voluntarily, thus negating the need for a hearing. As the latter option would have implied guilt, Oppenheimer refused to be sidelined and decided to fight for his name and reputation.

Polenberg reveals that the American government at this time “was motivated less by a belief that Oppenheimer’s continued clearance imperilled national security than by a fear that failure to act would expose it to attack” (p. xvii) from Senator Joseph McCarthy. There were widespread fears that any prosecution by him would irrevocably alienate much of America’s scientific community, with all that would mean in terms of the need for continued technological supremacy over the Soviet Union. Thus, many of Oppenheimer’s supporters were relieved at the announcement that the AEC – and not McCarthy – would conduct the hearing. How misplaced was their faith.

While the appearance of the hearing was one of impartiality and fairness, reality was entirely different: the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), beginning on 1 January 1954, at once placed Oppenheimer under constant physical

and technical surveillance. Particularly alarming was that telephone intercepts picked up most of the physicist's discussions with his lawyers, information that eventually reached Roger Robb, the man selected by the AEC to argue its case against the beleaguered Jewish scientist. Such an egregious violation of Oppenheimer's right to confidentiality in discussions with his legal team was justified in terms of trying to learn of any plans to flee the country. Thus, the defence's entire strategy was undermined from the very first moment.

All charges related to the scientist's activities in the years before 1943 and to his alleged opposition to the development of the hydrogen bomb. As one of the FBI agents involved remarked, "we have no substantial information of a pro-communist nature concerning Oppenheimer subsequent to 1943." (p. xix) Even more detestable was the prosecution's exclusive access to secret files compiled by the FBI and other agencies on the physicist. The defence was refused the right to consult such documents on grounds that their security clearances were inadequate. Thus, even if the proceedings themselves were a model of civility, any pretence of fairness fell quickly by the wayside when, on four occasions, Oppenheimer's lawyers had to leave the room while the prosecution presented "secret" evidence.

The main problem, simply put, was that the onus was on the defence, and not on the prosecution, to prove their case – clearly an impossible proposition. Determined to cooperate fully, Oppenheimer – after being assured that all proceedings would remain secret – was very frank about his intimate life and even named some former colleagues and students whom he knew to be communists, or at least sympathizers. Then, by mid-June 1954, the AEC suddenly and inexplicably decided to publish the sessions' transcripts, of which Polenberg here includes what he deems to be the most important segments. While the author suggests that the publication of the proceedings deeply embarrassed Oppenheimer, the impact of the transcripts on public opinion was much more damaging. Unaware of the unfairness of the hearings, many who had initially supported Oppenheimer were now convinced that the government's actions had been justified. In Polenberg's words, throughout this modern-day "Dreyfus affair" "the outcome was never in question." (p. xxiv)

Victor Madeira is in the final year of a doctoral degree in Modern History at the University of Cambridge. His dissertation examines British official perceptions of and reactions to Soviet espionage and subversion in Great Britain from 1917 to 1931.

Mitrovica, Andrew. *Covert Entry: Spies, Lies and Crimes Inside Canada's Secret Service*. Toronto: Random House Canada, 2002.

Since the establishment of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984, opportunities for Canadians to get a glimpse of the inner workings of our domestic secret service have been few and far between. The literature on the topic remains scarce and the release of Andrew Mitrovica's *Covert Entry* triggered high hopes of seeing a contemporary, in-depth look into CSIS activities finally reaching the shelves of our bookstores and libraries. However, what *The Globe and Mail* investigative journalist delivers is interesting at best, and disappointing in many ways.

Covert Entry is about John J. Farrell and his involvement in CSIS operations and activities. The book starts by briefly addressing Farrell's tough childhood, as well as his first jobs as security guard and prison warden. Despite poor academic results and an early-earned criminal record, Farrell's drive and ambition convinced one of Canada Post's Managers for Security and Investigation Services to hire him as a Postal Inspector at the age of 21. Finally, after about two years spent with Canada Post, Farrell was "borrowed" by CSIS in the capacity of an Auxiliary Postal Inspector.

The core of Mitrovica's book describes the day-to-day activities of Farrell, including the role he played in the mail interception operation directed against union activists at Canada Post. (pp. 60-75)¹ In 1994, while working on a criminology degree to become a full-time intelligence officer, Farrell was brought into the CSIS' Special Operational Services (SOS). Mitrovica describes in great detail the operations in which Farrell took part, from the sometimes tricky mail interception programme code-named OPERATION VULVA (sic) (pp. 86-281) to the high-profile surveillance OPERATION STANLEY CUP directed against two Russian agents of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). (pp. 173-197) While the author goes into interesting operational details, he focuses more on the countless, quite serious security lapses that Farrell noted during his involvement in CSIS operations.

The description of Farrell's activities also allows the reader to get a glimpse into the methods and gadgets used for CSIS operations, whether it is screening garbage (pp. 46 and 65), intercepting and opening private mail (pp. 84 and 85), setting up front companies (p. 163), breaking in apartments (pp. 194 and 205), loading a car with listening and tracking devices (p. 207), or stealing a Crown key to open relay boxes, mailboxes, and apartment panels. (p. 207) But the reader also gets plenty of details about what Farrell perceives to be goofs, hard-to-believe security breaches, amateurish handling of operations, and abuses of CSIS' goods and moneys by intelligence officers.

The last part of Mitrovica's book describes how Farrell, in 1997, slowly but surely started to be pushed aside from CSIS operations, finally leading to his

“divorce” with the Service in 1998. Throughout the book, we get to understand the importance of money to Farrell and consequently why, as his involvement in secret intelligence started to decline, he invested so much energy in trying to get financial compensation for his unpaid overtime work and his employment termination. He even exchanged correspondence with CSIS Director Ward Elcock, telling him about all the unlawful activities he had been part of in the name of national security – but to no avail. CSIS stood firm on its argument that Farrell had never been a CSIS employee because all through these years Farrell remained officially attached to and paid by Canada Post. On 6 December 2002, after the book was published, Justice MacKay of the Federal Court sided with CSIS and dismissed Farrell’s court action on the premise that, according to the law, only individuals appointed directly by the Director of CSIS can become CSIS employees (decision T-1726-01).² Therefore, since he had not been formally appointed by the Director, Farrell’s only employment link was with Canada Post.

After reading the book, one might feel sympathy for a young man who dedicated many years of his life, broke the law, and took risks for the benefit of CSIS, and who is only asking fair compensation for his dedication. But this is not the complete picture. Indeed, right from the outset, Mitrovica – who once said that “the press in Canada is the only intelligence agency that is accountable before the public” – clearly states his bias, and all through the book, we only get to read about the “good little boy” outraged by the actions of the “evil government agency.” This one-sided view greatly undermines the credibility of the book as the reader perceives Farrell’s story as the personal vendetta of a bitter young man. In addition, Mitrovica focuses on a very limited area of CSIS operations and he seems to leave aside the fundamental premise that a secret service has to act covertly and sometimes on the edge of the law to be effective. This book is not about Canadian intelligence but rather about how amazing Farrell is and how disastrous CSIS is. Still, it gives invaluable access to the details of some CSIS contemporary operations and to the way things get done in the field. But one should not forget that after all, this book is about a bitter, angry former CSIS informant who seems to have nothing to lose by telling “his truth” to a well-known journalist.

Jerome Mellon completed a Master of Arts degree in Intelligence and International Relations at the University of Salford in 2002, and is presently a litigation lawyer in Montreal.

Endnotes

1. See CSIS, “Allegations that CSIS is spying on postal workers,” *News Release*, 11 July 2000; and Jeff Sallot and Andrew Mitrovica, “Postal union threatens lawsuit to halt spying,” *The Globe and Mail*, 12 July 2000.
2. Available at <http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fct/2002/2002fct1271.html>.

Carment, David, and Patrick James, eds. *Peace in the Midst of Wars: Preventing and Managing International Ethnic Conflicts*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1998.

Following the end of the Cold War many believed that the new world order would yield unprecedented peace; yet instead it opened the doors for old religious and tribal hatreds to resurface in places like the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The authors argue in *Peace in the Midst of Wars*, that the demise of communism afforded new “freedoms” that lead to this wave of nationalism, which then became the catalyst for bloody ethnic conflicts all over the world. The editors, David Carment and Patrick James, bring together a collection of essays examining the common origins of ethnic conflict, the ways to prevent its escalation and how peacekeeping fits into the modern reality of identity-based conflict.

The foundation of ethnic conflict is nationalism, which assumes ethnicity and territorial boundaries should be synonymous, an assumption that cannot be reconciled. (Ryan p. 74-75) Nationalism is often born of ignorance, fear, and hatred and when combined with economic hardship it can become fodder for extremist leaders intent on exploiting these tensions for their own gain. Both Kriesburg and Ryan agree that a common feature of ethnic conflict, though often not the root cause, is uneven distribution of wealth and the resentment that builds as a result. Prosperous groups, like the Basques of Spain and the Ibo of Nigeria, are examples of this, according to the authors. Kriesburg asserts that the existence of ethnic conflict and associated levels of violence are stirred by aggravating factors including the internal character of the communal group (i.e. existence of extremist leaders, socio-economic position, cultural myths), and relative position of groups within the system context. (p. 34) Likewise, Stephen Ryan argues in Chapter 3 that areas of conflict potentially leading to violence are land disputes, uneven distribution of wealth, exploitation of domestic conflict by regional neighbors and fear of assimilation and/or genocide. Once these conditions exist the conflict can escalate violently particularly if the conflict becomes militarized, options are prematurely closed, and there is a sense of victimization. (Ryan, p. 79) Occasionally, the “hurting” stalemate” will become a factor, as each side realizes that continuation of violence will hurt both sides. This realization may stop the violence temporarily but does nothing to address the underlying causes. (Ryan, p. 80)

Understanding a group’s fear of extinction is important when appraising the breath and depth of an ethnic conflict. Because these types of conflict, “whose complexity escapes the grasp of most Westerners” (Fortmann, et al, p. 126) are so emotional and protracted the antagonisms easily lend themselves to escalated violence. (Haaglund and Pentland, p. 96) The prevention of ethnic violence by a third party like the United Nations (UN) is sometimes the key to avert-

ing situations that are likely to spiral out of control. (Morrison, p. 294) Called preventative diplomacy, it involves prevention of violence in present conflicts and management of old conflicts through tools like cease-fire agreements. (Ryan, p. 67) Despite this, it must be acknowledged that major powers will not intervene unless tangible humanitarian or political gains are possible. In reference to this Carment and James write “. . . the essence of statecraft is to develop and manage relationships with other states in ways that will protect and enhance one’s own security and welfare.” (p. 312) Clearly, goodwill is an element of third party intervention, but it is not the central focal point in an anarchic world order. Peacekeeping is defined as “. . . the non-violent use of third party armed forces to maintain peace among belligerents.” (Kaufman, p. 197) The author comments that although the word “peacekeeping” is a familiar term its duties and purpose have changed in recent years. It now encompasses observatory functions, institution building, conciliation and mediation, in addition to traditional operations. He notes that dangers involving peacekeeping include the possibility of becoming entrenched in a war of perception or becoming an accelerant to an already explosive situation if they are not seen as impartial or if sovereignty has been encroached upon. (James, p. 178-181, Carment and James, p. 302-03) Peacekeeping operations in the Congo, Lebanon and Bosnia-Herzegovina are prime examples of this. Having said this, countries cannot be permitted to hide behind their sovereignty as a vehicle for inaction; as, according to the author, it is a relative freedom and not an absolute. (James, p. 189)

Determining the origins of ethnic conflict is difficult; however the solutions to these complexities are even more elusive. Ryan asserts that containment and resolution of violence is probable when confidence is instilled, early warning systems established, and demilitarized zones identified. Alan James agrees by contending that without the physical separation of all parties involved and a viable written agreement negotiated in good faith, the peace process will inevitably fail by allowing the parties to continue, “upping the ante.” Some of the elements needed for resolution proposed by the authors include cultural awareness, restriction of the supply of arms, promotion of pluralism, and redistribution of wealth. Similarly, Frank Harvey in Chapter 8 proposes that solutions to ethnic conflict will be found with in-depth research into the causes and resolutions. (p. 257) However, through all of this remains one truth: “Peacekeeping can only work when the parties to the conflict want the peace to be kept.” (Kaufman, p. 195)

Although each essay in *Peace in the Midst of Wars* has a unique perspective there is one commonality: war can only be de-escalated, prevented, and halted with the deployment of a multi-faceted approach. Conflict is not one-dimensional, the book argues, and therefore should not be treated in an ad hoc fashion. This sentiment is echoed on page 84 when the author says if peacekeeping “is not properly coordinated . . . they may provide a false sense of security and perpetuate de facto situations without removing the smouldering potential causes for

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renewed violence.” Furthermore, Alex Morrison recognizes that states are not the only entities involved, instead offering a holistic approach between non-governmental organizations, civilian forces, and multilateral bodies like the United Nations (who incidentally must deal with member states in arrears in order to be effective).

Carment and James succeed in gathering a collection of insightful essays on the many elements of ethnic conflict. Despite the need for further study it can be said that *Peace in the Midst of Wars* is a valuable addition to the scholarship on ethnic conflict and peacekeeping – in all its forms. It is recommended for those who want to dig deeper beneath today’s headlines.

Tracey O’Reilly holds a Master of Arts degree in political science from Memorial University of Newfoundland. Currently she works for the Government of Alberta as a post-secondary policy analyst.